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very few controversial pieces of legislation in recent memory. 
In the space of one day, he managed to convince the Assembly 
to pass the version of the Wage Theft Prevention Act that had 
passed the Senate, in spite of the Assembly having a compet-
ing version of the bill. Had he failed, the bill would not have 
become law.
n   n   n
On December 14, 2010, almost exactly nine months after the 
introduction of the Wage Theft Prevention Act in the New York 
State Assembly and Senate, Augusto Fernandez, janitor and 
Make the Road New York member for a decade, stood side by 
side with Governor Paterson. Flanked by Senator Savino, As-
semblyman Heastie, the commissioner of labor, and legislative 
leaders, Governor Paterson and Fernandez each spoke before 
the cameras briefly. Then the governor sat down to sign the 
















Fighting for Environmental Justice 
Takes Long-Lasting Coalitions
“It’s official!” read Theresa Mueller’s long-awaited February 
2011 e-mail to community activists. A veteran deputy city at-
torney with the San Francisco City Attorney’s Office, Mueller 
was referring to a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission deci-
sion that finally allowed the Potrero power plant, the second 
of the two dirtiest fossil fuel power plants in the most polluted 
area of San Francisco, to close. 
Power plants do not typically close. Although power plants 
are designed to operate for thirty to forty years, most pow-
er plants continue to operate long beyond their planned life 
spans. The last step in a long list of agency, corporate, and po-
litical decisions that made the closure possible, the Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission’s decision to accept the plant op-
erator’s request to cease supplying energy was thus unusual. 
The seeming simplicity of the decision also belies the historic 
moment it represented: it was the culmination of more than a 
decade of work by a loose, sometimes contentious alliance of 
grassroots organizers, residents of the community surrounding 
the power plant, politicians, lawyers (including Mueller herself 
and professors at the Environmental Law and Justice Clinic at 
Golden Gate University School of Law), and law students. This 
is the story of that alliance, why the alliance worked, and the 
larger lessons of its success. 
Background
The story begins with the historic residential segregation that 
pooled low-income people of color—mostly African Ameri-
cans—in the Bayview-Hunters Point neighborhood, which be-
came the most polluted and economically depressed place in 
famously progressive San Francisco. Until five years ago this 
neighborhood and nearby areas hosted a myriad of the city’s 
pollution sources and its only two power plants: Pacific Gas 
and Electric’s Hunters Point plant and Mirant’s Potrero plant 
(Alan Ramo, Hunters Point: Energy Development Meets Envi-
ronmental Justice, 5 environMental law newS 28 (Spring 1996); 
see also my Pursuing Environmental Justice: Obstacles and Op-
portunities—Lessons from the Field, 31 waShington univerSity 
Journal of law and Policy 121, 134 (2009)). The Hunters Point 
plant closed in 2006, and residents have successfully fought 
off several proposed power plants slated for the same area 
over the last decade. Accounts of the community’s struggle 
have been told in newspaper and law review articles (Clifford 
Rechtschaffen, Fighting Back Against a Power Plant: Some Les-
sons from the Legal and Organizing Efforts of the Bayview-
Hunters Point Community, 14 haStingS weSt-northweSt Journal 
of environMental law and Policy 537, 538 (2008); Dennis Pfaff, 
Conquering the Regulatory Jungle, Law School Clinic Emerges 
with Rare Fruit from Environmental Fight: A Win, San franciSco 
daily Journal, May 24, 2006, at 1; Ramo). Because the resi-
dents had a “stick-with-it-ness” to the cause, educated and 
connected with politicians, and built a broad coalition, the 
community prevailed. 
Connection to Political Power
Environmental justice struggles are struggles about power (see 
Luke Cole, Environmental Justice and the Three Great Myths 
of White Americana, 14 haStingS weSt-northweSt Journal of en-
vironMental law & Policy 573, 576 (2008)). A key ingredient 
of the power plant campaign was the Bayview-Hunters Point 
community’s connection to political power. Collaboration be-
tween city politicians and community representatives would 
not have been possible without a member of the San Fran-
cisco board of supervisors, Sophie Maxwell, who understood 
the campaign at a visceral level, having first become involved 
in the campaign as a community activist, and without the San 
Francisco Office of the City Attorney becoming a partner in 
the community’s struggle. These connections proved invalu-
able as the decade of struggle went through ups and downs, 
with the plants’ closure uncertain at many times as political 
winds and energy needs—both perceived and real—shifted.
The Community’s Politician . Maxwell, who termed out of 
office in 2011, represented the political district of the neigh-
borhoods surrounding the power plants. The district ranks 
ninth out of eleven in per capita income, and the district is 
still where most of the city’s African American residents live. 
Before her entry into politics, Maxwell served on the board of 
directors of a grassroots coalition group, Southeast Alliance 
for Environmental Justice, which worked to reduce pollution 
from the power plants and to clean up the city’s only Super-
fund site, located in the same neighborhood. She understood 
the community’s concerns; Maxwell herself developed asthma 
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upon moving into the neighborhood and lost her son to can-
cer, which she believes might have been related to the area’s 
environmental degradation (Rachel Gordon, Sophie Maxwell 
Fights for Environmental Justice, San franciSco chronicle, Dec. 
12, 2010, http://bit.ly/mU0vs9). 
From the beginning of her tenure, Maxwell served on a citizen 
advisory task force on power plants; the city’s progressive su-
pervisors established the task force to receive input from the 
community. With residents who lived near the power plants as 
members, the task force not only enabled voters to voice their 
concerns to politicians but also became a conduit for informa-
tion about relevant decisions and developments. Communities 
affected by pollution often lack such conduits. Because of the 
task force, residents and advocacy groups received timely in-
formation, enabling community mobilization. 
Maxwell also used her position to educate her political peers 
about the potential environmental impact of their decisions. 
Maxwell’s role was seen most dramatically in her response to 
Mayor Gavin Newsom’s announcement, around the time that 
the Potrero power plant was originally scheduled to be shut-
tered in 2007, that his administration would support a retrofit 
of the Potrero plant and its continued operation over perma-
nent closure. As a supervisor first and then as mayor, Newsom 
had long supported the plant’s closure. But he reneged on 
the commitment just before running to become governor of 
California—a bid that he eventually withdrew. He claimed that 
the retrofit would be a cleaner alternative because it would 
replace natural gas for diesel, undoubtedly a dirtier fuel. He 
also claimed that the retrofit would be cheaper for consum-
ers than the previously announced plan for San Francisco to 
build its own replacement power plants and that the retrofit 
would be a temporary solution until the city found renewable 
alternatives.
In response, on October 22, 2008, Maxwell—in a flourish that 
exemplified government at its best—held a hearing as the 
chairwoman of the land use and economic development com-
mittee of the board of supervisors. She called representatives 
of Mirant (the plant operator), San Francisco’s Public Utilities 
Commission (the city entity that approved the retrofit plan), 
and pro bono industry experts to testify: Mirant and the Pub-
lic Utilities Commission were underestimating the cost of the 
proposed retrofit at $78 million. The emissions benefits touted 
by Newsom and the commission had never been achieved by 
any power plant operator (Amanda Witherell, Mayor’s Power 
Plan Flawed, San franciSco Bay guardian online (Oct. 26, 2008), 
http://bit.ly/lkv3Qm). Loretta Lynch, a former president of the 
California Public Utilities Commission, also testified that the 
power plant, once it spent that kind of money, would not be 
able to close and that such a postretrofit closure had never oc-
curred. Mirant and commission representatives presented no 
contrary evidence. The retrofit proposal died.
Over the years Maxwell and other supervisors (particularly 
Aaron Pestkin) sponsored several resolutions that laid the 
groundwork for the city’s opposition to the continued opera-
tion of the power plant and expansion of the Potrero plant 
through new construction of a major unit (attempted before 
the retrofit proposal). One such resolution outright opposed 
the expansion (Opposition to the Proposed Potrero Unit 7 
Power Plant, San Francisco Board of Supervisors Res. No. 458-
03 (June 30, 2003), http://bit.ly/mqalnj). Another resolution 
opposed the regional water board’s renewal of a water permit 
to use environmentally harmful once-through cooling (Op-
posing Renewal of Wastewater Discharge Permit for Potrero 
Power Plant Unit 3, San Francisco Board of Supervisors Res. 
No. 465-08 (Oct. 28, 2008), http://bit.ly/iFHjgc). The practice 
withdrew more than 200 million gallons of San Francisco Bay 
water daily to cool the plant—harming the organisms sucked 
into the cooling system as well as those affected by discharges 
of contaminated water. The city’s position on the practice al-
lowed supporters of the plant closure to put economic pres-
sure on the plant owner because phasing out the antiquated 
practice would have been costly.
The City Attorney’s Office . Political and legal support for the 
campaign came from two city attorneys’ successive adminis-
trations. The first was Louise Renne, a progressive advocate 
known for suing tobacco companies and gun manufacturers 
on behalf of the people. Dennis Herrera, who succeeded her, 
lived near the Potrero plant. Throughout the campaign the 
city attorney’s office had the same principal lawyer assigned: 
Deputy City Attorney Mueller, an energy law and policy expert 
who navigated the world of the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, the California Public Utilities Commission, the 
California Energy Commission, and the nonprofit energy grid 
manager California Independent System Operator, all of which 
regulate power plants. Mueller had the tenacity to work on a 
long campaign and a collaborator’s attitudinal attributes: re-
spect for community representatives, integrity, and openness. 
She managed to work with all of the actors in the plant’s clo-
sure without ever compromising her duty to her client. 
Mueller’s technical and strategic advice helped the city attor-
neys formulate their opposition to the power plant expansions 
and the renewal of the Potrero plant’s water permit. Working 
behind the scenes to ensure that the politicians could scru-
tinize information from Mirant and California Independent 
System Operator, among other energy regulators, she nego-
tiated the fine balance necessary to close the plant without 
jeopardizing the city’s demand for reliable power. Once the city 
attorney determined that the regulators would not allow the 
plants to close without improved reliability in power transmis-
sion and additional power generation to replace the expected 
lost power from closure, Mueller made sure that her office, the 
power plant task force, and interested politicians focused on 
transmission upgrades by persistently following up with Cali-
fornia Independent System Operator to spur the completion of 
the transmission projects. 
Herrera also used creative strategies to ensure closure. In Feb-
ruary 2009, after Potrero’s promised 2007 closure did not oc-
cur, Herrera sued Mirant for violating the city’s seismic upgrade 
ordinance, the city having excused the violation in the expec-
tation of the closure (San Francisco v. Mirant Potrero Limited 
Liability Company, No. CGC -09-487-795 (Cal. Super. Ct. S.F. 
Cnty. April 27, 2009)). The settlement of this lawsuit in Au-
gust 2009 required Mirant to close the plant once it was no 
longer needed for electric reliability and pay $1 million to the 
city to redress pediatric asthma in the communities affected 
by the power plant’s pollution (San Francisco, Cal., Settlement 
of Lawsuit and Disputes and Agreement to Close the Potrero 
Power Plant, Ordinance 220-09 (Oct. 27, 2009), http://bit.ly/
kMfaPG). Herrera’s office, through Mueller, then continued to 
ensure that Mirant and its corporate successor sought the ap-
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provals necessary from California Independent System Opera-
tor and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to termi-
nate the plant’s agreement to supply power.
The Community’s Stick-to-It-Ness
The stability of the campaign’s participants contributed to the 
community’s endurance of more than a decade of aspirations 
and disappointments and strategizing in multiple corporate, 
political, and government forums.
Community Organizing . In the 1990s community groups 
nationwide increased as community organizing came to be a 
tool in the fight for economic and environmental justice. One 
of the groups formed during that time was Bayview Hunters 
Point Community Advocates. The group’s founders are resi-
dents of the Bayview Hunters Point community. Karen Pierce, 
a group leader, lawyer by training, longtime resident of the 
neighborhood, and San Francisco Department of Health em-
ployee, served on the power plant task force and was the En-
vironmental Law and Justice Clinic’s point person during the 
campaign.
Other key groups also were stable. Greenaction, which mobi-
lized and organized residents for demonstrations, and Com-
munities for a Better Environment, which provided technical 
and strategic support (Greg Karras being the principal strate-
gist) throughout the struggle, as when we opposed the re-
newal of the water permit and the retrofit proposal, have both 
been around since the beginning of the struggle. Indeed, it 
was Communities for a Better Environment that produced a 
2001 report showing that very little replacement power would 
be needed with system upgrades, renewable energy invest-
ments, and efficiency measures (Communities for a Better En-
vironment, Power and Justice: Electricity, Environment, Race, 
Class and Health in San Francisco, California (Nov. 2001); Alan 
Ramo, California’s Energy Crisis—The Perils of Crisis Manage-
ment and a Challenge to Environmental Justice, 7 alBany law 
environMental outlook Journal, 1, 22 n.81 (2002)). (Similar re-
ports followed later from Pacific Gas and Electric and eventu-
ally enabled the Potrero plant’s closure.)
Legal Support . The stability of the Environmental Law and 
Justice Clinic both in staffing and funding contributed to the 
stick-to-it-ness. Founded in 1994, the clinic grew up with this 
struggle. Virtually all of the lawyers, technical staff, and law 
students who have worked at the clinic have had some hand 
in closing the two plants and preventing the use of the Hunt-
ers Point neighborhoods for additional energy generation. 
Master tactician Prof. Alan Ramo was the clinic’s director from 
1994 to 2007. Professor Ramo worked with law students to 
create pollution profiles and motivate the city’s department of 
health to do a health survey. These efforts produced informa-
tion showing disproportionate breast cancer rates in the com-
munity, along with disproportionate rates of other diseases, 
and ultimately swaying politicians to fight on behalf of their 
constituents (Rechtschaffen at 553–56).
The clinic contributed to community groups being able to re-
tain counsel free of charge to participate in a more than year-
long proceeding before the California Energy Commission to 
fight both a proposal for a new plant and the expansion of 
the Potrero plant (Ramo, Hunters Point at 29). The clinic’s phi-
losophy—that the clinic exists to serve communities—also so-
lidified the clinic’s standing in the community. This philosophy 
enabled the clinic to work with the many community groups 
as they formed and disbanded, ranging from a local home-
owners’ association with members who lived across the street 
from a proposed power plant, to a coalition of groups. The 
clinic’s work with various groups over the years and its insti-
tutional knowledge enabled the homeowners’ association to 
fight off another planned power plant. Working with South-
east Alliance for Environmental Justice, a coalition of tenants, 
neighborhood organizations, and small businesses, the clinic 
persuaded Pacific Gas and Electric to agree to shut down its 
Hunters Point power plant. 
Power Structure . At the political power level both Maxwell 
and the city attorney’s office were constants in our struggle. 
Maxwell’s longevity on the board of supervisors connected the 
community to power with institutional stability. She served 
on the board from November 2000 to January 2011. Fittingly 
both of the power plants went with her. The city attorney’s 
office had been involved in the struggle even before Maxwell 
became a supervisor.
Power from Broad Coalitions
Without stable participants and a community able to marshal 
political power, there is no telling how successful the fight to 
close the polluting power plants would have been. To ensure 
success, the community also built coalitions that extended 
beyond its borders. Coalition building signaled broad support 
for the cause and enabled coalition members to tap into one 
another’s expertise.
In 2001, for example, the clinic was informed that the Potrero 
plant was exceeding the number of hours that it could operate 
its diesel-powered electricity generating units under a federal 
air permit. One of the clinic’s clients, Our Children’s Earth, was 
interested in enforcing the permit to demand accountability 
from Mirant and from both federal and local regulators that 
had entered into agreements to allow the exceedance despite 
the federal permit issued under the Clean Air Act. But the en-
vironmental group also wanted to support the southeast San 
Francisco community’s effort to close down the Potrero plant. 
Accordingly Our Children’s Earth filed a lawsuit with Bayview 
Hunters Point Community Advocates, also represented by the 
clinic, and Communities for a Better Environment to enforce 
the permit limits (Bayview Hunters Point Community Advo-
cates v. Mirant Potrero Limited Liability Company, No. C-01-
2348-PJH (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2001)). The clinic also supported 
a similar lawsuit brought by Renne’s office (City and County of 
San Francisco v. Mirant Potrero Limited Liability Company, No. 
C-01-2356-PJH (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2001)). Together the groups 
availed of the clinic’s Clean Air Act expertise and the city at-
torney’s credibility—particularly helpful when challenging the 
federal and local regulators that had permitted the Clean Air 
Act violations. The lawsuit successfully compelled the Potrero 
plant to cease exceeding the permit limit and to pay $105,000 
in lieu of fines to a foundation for projects to benefit air quality 
in southeast San Francisco (Consent Decree, Bayview Hunters 
Point Community Advocates, No. C-01-2348-PJH (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 30, 2001)). This kind of coalition building recognized that 
ensuring the plant’s environmental compliance until the plant 
could be shut down was pragmatic. Noncompliance could 
lead to externalizing the true cost of running a company, and 
Advocacy Stories
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this could contribute to operating the plant far longer than it 
should be operating without pollution controls. 
The clinic and other groups also built coalitions with San Fran-
cisco BayKeeper and other organizations interested in phas-
ing out once-through cooling from power plants operating 
throughout California and in other states. With these collabo-
rators, the clinic submitted several petitions to the California 
Regional Water Quality Control Board about various water 
permit compliance issues and supplied student testimony to 
state regulators. 
Lessons
The clinic’s effort on behalf of community groups in the Bayview-
Hunters Point neighborhood has produced outcomes that touch 
the lives of our clients every day: our students, staff lawyers, and 
professors successfully closed two of the dirtiest power plants in 
California and have twice prevented more pollution-generating 
power plants from being sited in the same neighborhood. Some 
of the power necessary to replace the lost power from the clo-
sure of the two plants, however, is now coming to the city from 
another similarly situated community populated by low-income 
people of color. 
This community in Contra Costa County, across the San Fran-
cisco Bay, is home to more than half of the power generated 
in the bay area. More than fifteen electric generating power 
plants are within a six-mile radius in Pittsburg and Antioch, 
and residents are suffering increased rates of disease as in the 
Bayview-Hunters Point community. Yet the area, including 
San Francisco, using the power generated from Contra Costa 
County has more than an adequate margin to supply energy 
even during peak needs. Power plants continue to be built 
in Contra Costa County, however, because of perverse regu-
lations that guarantee a return on these power plant invest-
ments.
n   n   n
The results of the Bayview-Hunters Point campaign should 
raise questions for the energy regulators and groups that 
worked on the closure. Environmental justice advocates must 
continue working to change governmental policies that result 
in inexcusable concentrations of power plants in areas popu-
lated by political minorities. Working locally is not enough. En-
vironmental justice advocates must think regionally. We need 
to find a way to respect both the tenets of environmental jus-
tice—that those affected by pollution decide which campaigns 
to pursue—and to ensure that one community’s success is not 
another’s failure. That is our continuing challenge.
Helen Kang
Associate Professor
Director, Environmental Law and Justice Clinic
Golden Gate University School of Law
536 Mission St.
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